Cratylus

Plato

Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 4 translated by Harold North Fowler; Introduction by W.R.M. Lamb. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1926.

Socrates. And I, too, Hermogenes. But do not, my friend, demand too much precision, lest you

enfeeble me of my sight.

Hom. Il. 6.265 For now that τέχνη (art) is disposed of, I am nearing the loftiest height of my subject, when once we have investigated μηχανή(contrivance). For I think μηχανή signifies ἄνειν ἐπὶ πολύ (much accomplishment); for μῆκος (length) has about the same meaning as τὸ πολύ (much), and the name μηχανή is composed of these two, μῆκος and ἄνειν. But, as I was just saying, we must go on to the loftiest height of our subject; we must search for the meaning of the words ἀρετή (virtue) and κακία (wickedness). Now one of them I cannot yet see; but the other seems to be quite clear, since it agrees with everything we have said before. For inasmuch as all things are in motion, everything that moves badly (κακῶς ἰόν) would be evil (κακία); and when this evil motion in relation to its environment exists in the soul, it receives the general name κακία (evil) in the special sense of wickedness. But the nature of evil motion (κακῶς ἰέναι) is made clear, I think, also in the word δειλία (cowardice), which we have not yet discussed. We passed it by, when we ought to have examined it after ἀνδρεία (courage); and I fancy we passed over a good many other words. Now the meaning of δειλία is a strong bond of the soul; for λίαν (excessively) is, in a way, expressive of strength; so δειλία would be the excessive or greatest bond (δεσμός, δεῖν) of the soul; and so, too, ἀπορία (perplexity) is an evil, as is everything, apparently, which hinders motion and progress (πορεύεσθαι). This, then, seems to be the meaning of evil motion (κακῶς ἰέναι), that advance is halting and impeded; and the soul that is infected by it becomes filled with wickedness (κακία). If these are the reasons for the name of wickedness, virtue (ἀρετή) would be the opposite of this; it would signify first ease of motion, and secondly that the flow of the good soul is always unimpeded, and therefore it has received this name, which designates that which always flows (ἀεὶ ῥέον) without let or hindrance. It is properly called ἀειρειτή, or perhaps also αἱρετή, indicating that this condition is especially to be chosen; but it has been compressed and is pronounced ἀρετή. Perhaps you will say this is another invention of mine; but I say if what I said just now about κακία is right, this about the name of ἀρετή is right too.

Hermogenes. But what is the meaning of the word κακόν which you used in many of your derivations?

Socrates. By Zeus, I think it is a strange word and hard to understand; so I apply to it that contrivance of mine.

Hermogenes. What contrivance?

Socrates. The claim of foreign origin, which I advance in this case as in those others.

Hermogenes. Well, probably you are right. But, if you please, let us drop these words and try to discover the reasons for the words καλόν (beautiful, noble) and αἰσχρόν (base).

Socrates. I think the meaning of αἰσχρόν is clear, and this also agrees with what has been said before. For the giver of names appears to me throughout to denounce that which hinders and restrains things from flowing, and in this instance he gave to that which always restrains the flow (ἀεὶ ἴσχει τὸν ῥοῦν) this name ἀεισχοροῦν, which is now compressed and pronounced αἰσχρόν.

Hermogenes. What about καλόν?

Socrates. That is harder to understand, and yet it expresses its meaning: it has been altered merely in accent and in the length of the O.

Hermogenes. How is that?

Socrates. I think this word denotes intellect.

Hermogenes. What do you mean?

Socrates. Why, what do you think is the cause why anything is called by a name? Is it not the power which gave the name?

Hermogenes. Why, certainly.

Socrates. And is not that power the intellect either of gods or of men or both?

Hermogenes. Yes.

Socrates. Are not that which called things by name and that which calls them by name (τὸ καλοῦν) the same thing, namely intellect?

Hermogenes. Yes, clearly.

Socrates. And are not all works which are done by mind and intelligence worthy of praise, and those that are not done by them worthy of blame?

Hermogenes. Certainly.

Socrates. Does not the medical power perform medical works and the power of carpentry works of carpentry? Do you agree to that?

Hermogenes. I agree.

Socrates. And the beautiful performs beautiful works?

Hermogenes. It must do so.

Socrates. And the beautiful is, we say, intellect?

Hermogenes. Certainly.

Socrates. Then this name, the beautiful, is rightly given to mind, since it accomplishes the works which we call beautiful and in which we delight.

Hermogenes. Evidently.

Socrates. What further words of this sort are left for us?