Otho

Plutarch

Plutarch. Plutarch's Lives, Vol. XI. Perrin, Bernadotte, translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1926.

In other ways, too, the generals of Vitellius were more vexatious than those of Otho in their dealings with both cities and private persons. One of them, Caecina, had neither the speech nor the outward appearance of a Roman citizen, but was offensive and strange, a man of huge stature, who wore Gaulish trousers and long sleeves, and conversed by signs even with Roman officials.

His wife, too, accompanied him, with an escort of picked horsemen; she rode a horse, and was conspicuously adorned. Fabius Valens, the other general, was so rapacious that neither what he plundered from the enemy nor what he stole or received as gifts from the allies could satisfy him. Indeed, it was thought that this rapacity of his had delayed his march, so that he was too late for the battle at Placentia.

But some blame Caecina, who, they say, was eager to win the victory himself before Valens came, and so not only made other minor mistakes, but also joined battle inopportunely and without much spirit, thereby almost ruining their whole enterprise.

For when Caecina, repulsed from Placentia, had set out to attack Cremona, another large and prosperous city, first Annius Gallus, who was coming to the help of Spurina at Placentia, hearing upon the march that Placentia was safe, but that Cremona was in peril, changed his course and led his army to Cremona, where he encamped near the enemy; then his colleagues[*](Celsus, Paulinus and Spurina (v. 3), although Spurina is not mentioned further.) came one by one to his aid.

Caecina now placed a large body of men-at-arms in ambush where the ground was rough and woody, and then ordered his horsemen to ride towards the enemy, and if they were attacked, to withdraw little by little and retreat, until they had in this way drawn their pursuers into the ambush. But deserters brought word of all this to Celsus, who rode out with good horsemen to meet the enemy, followed up his pursuit with caution, surrounded the men in ambush, and threw them into confusion. Then he summoned his men-at-arms from the camp.

And apparently, if these had come up in time to the support of the cavalry, not a man of the enemy would have been left alive, but the whole army with Caecina would have been crushed and slain. As it was, however, Paulinus came to their aid too slowly and too late, and incurred the charge of sullying his reputation as a commander through excessive caution.