There was another Chrysippus, a native of Cnidus, a physician,[*](Cf. viii. 89-90, and note ad loc.; also Pliny, N.H. xxix. 5.) to whom Erasistratus says that he was under great obligation. And another besides, a son[*](Or perhaps a grandson, as Wilamowitz suggests, Antig. von Kar. p. 326.) of the former, court-physician to Ptolemy, who on a false charge was dragged about and castigated with the lash. And yet another was a pupil of Erasistratus, and another the author of a work on Agriculture.
To return to the philosopher. He used to propound arguments such as the following: He who divulges the mysteries to the uninitiated is guilty of impiety. Now the hierophant certainly does reveal the mysteries to the uninitiated, ergo he is guilty of impiety.[*](Cf. supr. ii. 101.) Or again: What is not in the city is not in the house either: now there is no well in the city, ergo there is none in the house either. Yet another: There is a certain head, and that head you have not. Now this being so, there is a head which you have not, therefore you are without a head.
Again: If anyone is in Megara, he is not in Athens: now there is a man in Megara,
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therefore there is not a man in Athens. Again: If you say something, it passes through your lips: now you say wagon, consequently a wagon passes through your lips. And further: If you never lost something, you have it still; but you never lost horns, ergo you have horns. Others attribute this to Eubulides.
There are people who run Chrysippus down as having written much in a tone that is gross and indecent. For in his work On the ancient Natural Philosophers at line 600 or thereabouts he interprets the story of Hera and Zeus coarsely, with details which no one would soil his lips by repeating.
Indeed, his interpretation of the story is condemned as most indecent. He may be commending physical doctrine; but the language used is more appropriate to street-walkers than to deities; and it is moreover not even mentioned by bibliographers, who wrote on the titles of books. What Chrysippus makes of it is not to be found in Polemo nor Hypsicrates, no, nor even in Antigonus. It is his own invention. Again, in his Republic he permits marriage with mothers and daughters and sons. He says the same in his work On Things for their own Sake not Desirable, right at the outset. In the third book of his treatise On Justice, at about line 1000, he permits eating of the corpses of the dead. And in the second book of his On the Means of Livelihood, where he professes to be considering a priori how the wise man is to get his living, occur the words:
And yet what reason is there that he should provide a living? For if it be to support life, life itself is after all a thing indifferent. If it be for pleasure, pleasure too is a thing indifferent. While if it be for virtue, virtue in itself is sufficient
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to constitute happiness. The modes of getting a livelihood are also ludicrous, as e.g. maintenance by a king; for he will have to be humoured: or by friends; for friendship will then be purchasable for money: or living by wisdom; for so wisdom will become mercenary. These are the objections urged against him.
As the reputation of his writings stands so high, I have decided to make a separate catalogue of them, arranged according to the class of subject treated. And they are as follows:
I. Logic.
Logical Theses. The Philosopher’s Inquiries. Dialectical Definitions addressed to Metrodorus, six books. On the Terms used in Dialectic, addressed to Zeno, one book. Art of Dialectic, addressed to Aristagoras, one book. Probable Hypothetical Judgements, addressed to Dioscurides, four books. II. Logic dealing with the subject matter.
First series: Of Judgements, one book. Of Judgements which are not Simple, one book. Of the Complex Judgement, addressed to Athenades, two books. Of Negative Judgements, addressed to Aristagoras, three books. Of Affirmative Judgements, addressed to Athenodorus, one book. V2_301
Of Judgements expressed by means of Privation, addressed to Thearus, one book. Of Indefinite Judgements, addressed to Dion, three books. On the Variety of Indefinite Judgements, four books. On Temporal Judgements, two books. On Judgements in the Perfect Tense, two books. Second series: Of a True Disjunctive Judgement, addressed to Gorgippides, one book. Of a True Hypothetical Judgement, addressed to Gorgippides, four books. Choosing from Alternatives, addressed to Gorgippides, one book. A Contribution to the Subject of Consequents, one book. On the Argument which employs three Terms, also addressed to Gorgippides, one book. On Judgements of Possibility, addressed to Clitus, four books. A Reply to the Work of Philo on Meanings, one book. On the Question what are False Judgements, one book. Third series: Of Imperatives, two books. Of Asking Questions, two books. Of Inquiry, four books. Epitome of Interrogation and Inquiry, one book. Epitome of Reply, one book. Of Investigation, two books. Of Answering Questions, four books. Fourth series: Of Predicates, addressed to Metrodorus, ten books. V2_303
Of Nominatives and Oblique Cases, addressed to Phylarchus, one book. Of Hypothetical Syllogisms, addressed to Apollonides, one book. A Work, addressed to Pasylus, on Predicates, four books. Fifth series: Of the Five Cases, one book. Of Enunciations classified according to subject matter, one book. Of Modification of Significance, addressed to Stesagoras, two books. Of Proper Nouns, two books. III. Logic, as concerned with words or phrases and the sentence.
First series: Of Singular and Plural Expressions, six books. On Single Words, addressed to Sosigenes and Alexander, five books. Of Anomalous Words or Phrases, addressed to Dion, four books. Of the Sorites Argument as applied to Uttered Words, three books. On Solecisms, one book. On Solecistic Sentences, addressed to Dionysius, one book. Sentences violating Ordinary Usage, one book. Diction, addressed to Dionysius, one book. Second series: Of the Elements of Speech and on Words Spoken, five books. Of the Arrangement of Words Spoken, four books. V2_305
Of the Arrangement and Elements of Sentences, addressed to Philip, three books. Of the Elements of Speech, addressed to Nicias, one book. Of the Relative Term, one book. Third series: Against Those who reject Division, two books. On Ambiguous Forms of Speech, addressed to Apollas, four books. On Figurative Ambiguities, one book. Of Ambiguity in the Moods of the Hypothetical Syllogism, two books. A Reply to the Work of Panthoides on Ambiguities, two books. Introduction to the Study of Ambiguities, five books. Epitome of the Work on Ambiguities, addressed to Epicrates, one book. Materials collected for the Introduction to the Study of Ambiguities, two books. IV. Logic as concerned with syllogisms and moods.
First series: Handbook of Arguments and Moods, addressed to Dioscurides, five books. Of Syllogisms, three books. Of the Construction of Moods, addressed to Stesagoras, two books. Comparison of the Judgements expressed in the Moods, one book. Of Reciprocal and Hypothetical Syllogisms, one book. To Agathon, or Of the Problems that remain, one book. On the Question what Premisses are capable of demonstrating a given Conclusion with the Aid of one or more Subsidiary Premisses, one book. V2_307
Of Inferences, addressed to Aristagoras, one book. How the same Syllogism may be drawn up in several Moods, one book. Reply to the Objections brought against drawing out the same Argument syllogistically and without a Syllogism, two books. Reply to the Objections against the Analyses of Syllogisms, three books. Reply to Philo’s Work on Moods, addressed to Timostratus, one book. Collected Logical Writings, addressed to Timocrates and Philomathes: a Criticism of their Works on Moods and Syllogisms, one book.