Vitae philosophorum

Diogenes Laertius

Diogenes Laertius. Hicks, R. D., editor. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1925.

Partition in logic is (according to Crinis) classification or distribution of a genus under heads: for instance, Of goods some are mental, others bodily.

Verbal ambiguity arises when a word properly, rightfully, and in accordance with fixed usage denotes two or more different things, so that at one and the same time we may take it in several distinct senses: e.g. in Greek, where by the same verbal expression may be meant in the one case that A house has three times fallen, in the other that a dancing-girl has fallen.

Posidonius defines Dialectic as the science dealing with truth, falsehood, and that which is neither true

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nor false; whereas Chrysippus takes its subject to be signs and things signified. Such then is the gist of what the Stoics say in their theory of language.

To the department dealing with things as such and things signified is assigned the doctrine of expressions, including those which are complete in themselves, as well as judgements and syllogisms and that of defective expressions comprising predicates both direct and reversed.[*](Direct Predicate answers to our Active Verb, Predicate reversed to our Passive; cf. supra, 43.)

By verbal expression they mean that of which the content corresponds to some rational presentation. Of such expressions the Stoics say that some are complete in themselves and others defective. Those are defective the enunciation of which is unfinished, as e.g. writes, for we inquire Who? Whereas in those that are complete in themselves the enunciation is finished, as Socrates writes. And so under the head of defective expressions are ranged all predicates, while under those complete in themselves fall judgements, syllogisms, questions, and inquiries.

A predicate is, according to the followers of Apollodorus, what is said of something; in other words, a thing associated with one or more subjects; or, again, it may be defined as a defective expression which has to be joined on to a nominative case in order to yield a judgement. Of predicates some are adjectival [and so have personal subjects], as e.g. to sail through rocks.[*](We should expect τὰ δὲ παρασυμβάματα to follow (cf. Luc. Vit. Auct. 21). By παρασύμβαμα is meant an impersonal verb with subject in oblique case, as μέλει μοι. For other conjectures see Zeller, Phil. der Gr. iii. 13, 89 note 2, 90.) Again, some predicates are direct, some reversed, some neither. Now direct predicates are those that are constructed with one of the oblique cases, as hears, sees, converses;

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while reversed are those constructed with the passive voice, as I am heard, I am seen. Neutral are such as correspond to neither of these, as thinks, walks. Reflexive predicates are those among the passive, which, although in form passive, are yet active operations,[*](An attempt to distinguish what we call the Middle Voice from the Passive—as e.g. συνέθεντο, they made compacts with each other, is more active (ὀρθά) than passive (ὔπτια).) as he gets his hair cut[*](Cf. Philo, L.A. iii. 201 (L.C.L. i. p. 436) ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἀντιδρᾷ καὶ ὥσπερ ἀντιπέπονθε σχηματίζων ἑαυτὸν πρὸς τὸ κείρεσθαι, the man—as distinct from a fleece being shorn—is both active and passive, as he suits his motions to the shaving.):

for here the agent includes himself in the sphere of his action. The oblique cases are genitive, dative, and accusative.

A judgement is that which is either true or false, or a thing complete in itself, capable of being denied in and by itself, as Chrysippus says in his Dialectical Definitions: A judgement is that which in and by itself can be denied or affirmed, e.g. It is day, Dion is walking. The Greek word for judgement (ἀξίωμα ) is derived from the verb ἀξιοῦν, as signifying acceptance or rejection; for when you say It is day, you seem to accept the fact that it is day. Now, if it really is day, the judgement before us is true, but if not, it is false.

There is a difference between judgement, interrogation, and inquiry, as also between imperative, adjurative, optative, hypothetical, vocative, whether that to which these terms are applied be a thing or a judgement. For a judgement is that which, when we set it forth in speech, becomes an assertion, and is either false or true: an interrogation is a thing complete in itself like a judgement but demanding an answer, e.g. Is it day? and this is so far neither true nor false. Thus It is day is a judgement; Is it day? an interrogation. An inquiry is something to which we cannot reply by signs, as you can nod Yes to an interrogation;

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but you must express the answer in words, He lives in this or that place.