Vitae philosophorum

By preconception they mean a sort of apprehension or a right opinion or notion, or universal idea stored in the mind; that is, a recollection of an external object often presented, e.g. Such and such a thing is a man: for no sooner is the word man uttered than we think of his shape by an act of preconception, in which the senses take the lead.[*](i.e. in conformity with the sense-data which precede the recognition.) Thus the object primarily denoted by every term is then plain and clear. And we should never have started an investigation, unless we had known what it was that we were in search of. For example: The object standing yonder is a horse or a cow. Before making this judgement, we must at some time or other have known by preconception the shape of a horse or a cow. We should not have given anything a name, if we had not first learnt its form by way of preconception. It follows, then, that preconceptions are clear. The object of a judgement is derived from something previously clear, by reference to which we frame the proposition, e.g. How do we know that this is a man?

Opinion they also call conception or assumption, and declare it to be true and false[*](See § 124, where a true πρόληψις is opposed to a false ὑπόληψις. In Aristotle ὑπόληψις is often a synonym of δόξα· cf. Bonitz, Index Ar., s.v.); for it is true if it is subsequently confirmed or if it is not contradicted by evidence, and false if it is not subsequently confirmed or is contradicted by evidence. Hence the introduction of the phrase, that which awaits confirmation, e.g. to wait and

get close to the tower and then learn what it looks like at close quarters.[*](See §§ 50, 147. The tower which seems round at a distance and square when we get up to it was the typical example in the school of that process of testing beliefs by observation which is here prescribed. Cf. Lucr. iv. 353 sqq., 501 sqq.; Sext. Emp. Adv. math. vii. 208.)

They affirm that there are two states of feeling, pleasure and pain, which arise in every animate being, and that the one is favourable and the other hostile to that being, and by their means choice and avoidance are determined[*](i.e. pleasure and pain are the criteria by which we choose and avoid.); and that there are two kinds of inquiry, the one concerned with things, the other with nothing but words.[*](Cf. inf.§ 37.)So much, then, for his division[*](Division of philosophy is probably meant.) and criterion in their main outline.

But we must return to the letter.[*](The letter to Herodotus is the second and most valuable instalment of Epicurean doctrine. The manuscript seems to have been entrusted to a scribe to copy, just as it was: scholia and marginal notes, even where they interrupt the thread of the argument, have been faithfully reproduced. See §§ 39, 40, 43, 44, 50, 66, 71, 73, 74, 75.)

Epicurus to Herodotus, greeting.

For those who are unable to study carefully all my physical writings or to go into the longer treatises at all, I have myself prepared an epitome[*](This, as the most authentic summary of Epicurean physics which we possess, serves as a groundwork in modern histories, e.g. Zeller’s. The reader may also consult with advantage Giussani, Studi Lucreziani (vol. i. of his Lucretius); Bignone, Epicurea, pp. 71-113; Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean, pp. 118-181.) of the whole system, Herodotus, to preserve in the memory enough of the principal doctrines,[*](Only the principal doctrines are contained in this epistle; more, both general and particular, was given in the Larger Compendium.) to the end that on every occasion they may be able to aid themselves on the most important points, so far as they take up the study of Physics. Those who have made some advance in the survey of the entire system ought to fix in their minds under the principal headings an

To the former, then—the main heads—we must continually return, and must memorize them so far as to get a valid conception of the facts, as well as the means of discovering all the details exactly when once the general outlines are rightly understood and remembered; since it is the privilege of the mature student to make a ready use of his conceptions by referring every one of them to elementary facts and simple terms. For it is impossible to gather up the results of continuous diligent study of the entirety of things, unless we can embrace in short formulas and hold in mind all that might have been accurately expressed even to the minutest detail.

Hence, since such a course is of service to all who take up natural science, I, who devote to the subject my continuous energy and reap the calm enjoyment of a life like this, have prepared for you just such an epitome and manual of the doctrines as a whole.

In the first place, Herodotus, you must understand what it is that words denote, in order that by reference to this we may be in a position to test opinions, inquiries, or problems, so that our proofs may not run on untested ad infinitum, nor the terms we use be empty of meaning.

For the primary signification of every term employed must be clearly seen, and ought to need no proving[*](Epicurus explains this more fully in Fr. 258 (Usener, p. 189). For proof and proving Bignone substitutes declaration and declare.); this being necessary, if we are to have something to which the point at issue or the problem or the opinion before us can be referred.

Next, we must by all means stick to our sensations, that is, simply to the present impressions whether of the mind or of any criterion whatever, and similarly to our actual feelings, in order that we may have the means of determining that which needs confirmation and that which is obscure.

When this is clearly understood, it is time to consider generally things which are obscure. To begin with, nothing comes into being out of what is non-existent.[*](This is no innovation of Epicurus but a tenet common to all the pre-Socratics: the One, or Nature as a whole, assumed by the Ionians, is unchangeable in respect of generation and destruction; cf. Aristotle, Met. i. 3. 984 a 31. The pluralists were naturally even more explicit: see the wellknown fragments, Anax. 17 d, Emped. 8 d. Lucretius (i. 180 f.) expands the doctrine.) For in that case anything would have arisen out of anything, standing as it would in no need of its proper germs.[*](Cf.§§ 41, 54. Lucr. i. 125 f. is the best commentary.)

And if that which disappears had been destroyed and become non-existent, everything would have perished, that into which the things were dissolved being non-existent. Moreover, the sum total of things was always such as it is now, and such it will ever remain. For there is nothing into which it can change. For outside the sum of things there is nothing which could enter into it and bring about the change.

Further [this he says also in the Larger Epitome near the beginning and in his First Book On Nature], the whole of being consists of bodies and space.[*](Usener’s insertion of bodies and space comes from § 86;cf.Diels,Dox. Gr. 581. 28.) For the existence of bodies is everywhere attested by sense itself, and it is upon sensation that reason must rely when it attempts to infer the unknown from the known.

And if there were no space (which we call also void and place and intangible nature),[*](Cf. Lucr. i. 426.) bodies would have nothing in which to be and

Again [he repeats this in the First Book and in Books XIV. and XV. of the work On Nature and in the Larger Epitome], of bodies some are composite, others the elements of which these composite bodies are made.