History of the Peloponnesian War

while their left had by this time passed the headland called Cynossema. But in consequence of this, they had to form their centre with weak and scattered ships, especially as they had the smaller number at their command, and the coast about Cynossema formed a sharp and angular projection, so that what was doing on the other side of it was not visible.

The Peloponnesians therefore, falling on their centre, drove the Athenian ships ashore, and landed to follow up their attack, having had a decided advantage in the action.

To assist their centre was neither in the power of Thrasybulu on the right, owing to the superior number of ships that were pressing on him, nor of Thrasylus on the left; for it was con cealed from him by the headland of Cynossema, and, moreover. the Syracusans and the rest who were opposed to him with no inferior numbers prevented his doing it: until the Peloponnesians, from pursuing, in the security of victory, different vessels in different directions, began to fall into greater disorder in one part of their force.

Thrasybulus therefore, observing this, ceased now from extending the flank, and facing about immediately attacked and routed the ships opposed to him; and then proceeding to those on the victorious part of the enemy's line, handled them roughly in their scattered condition, and threw most of them into a panic without striking a blow. The Syracusans also had by this time yielded the victory to Thrasylus, and taken to flight more decidedly, when they saw the rest doing so likewise.

The rout having thus been effected, and the Peloponnesians having most of them taken refuge at the mouth of the river Midius in the first instance, and then at Abydus, though the Athenians took but few ships, (for the narrow breadth of the Hellespont gave their opponents places of refuge at a little distance,) yet the victory which they gained in this sea-fight was most opportune for them.

For whereas they had before been afraid of the Peloponnesian fleet, in consequence of losses in detail, as well as of the disaster in Sicily, they now ceased to think disparagingly of themselves, and to consider their enemies as good for any thing at sea.

However, they took from their opponents eight Chian vessels, five Corinthian, two Ambracian, two Boeotian, and one Leucadian, Lacedaemonian, Syracusan, and Pellenian, respectively; while they themselves lost fifteen.

After erecting a trophy on the headland of Cynossema, securing the wrecks, and restoring the enemy their slain under a truce, they then despatched a trireme to Athens with the news of their victory.

On the arrival of the vessel, and on hearing of their unexpected good fortune, after the disasters which had recently befallen them in Euboea, and through their own sedition, they were much encouraged, and thought that their cause might still possibly prevail, if they supported it with vigour.

On the fourth day after the engagement, the Athenians at Sestos having hastily refitted their ships, sailed against Cyzicus, which had revolted. And descrying [*](ὀκτὼ ναῦς.] See ch. 80. 4.) the eight ships from Byzantium lying at anchor off Harpagium and Priapus, they attacked them, and took the vessels, after defeating in a battle those who came to help them on shore. On their arrival also at Cyzicus, which was unfortified, they got possession of it again, and levied a contribution from it.

In the mean time the Peloponnesians also sailed front Abydus to Elaeus, and recovered such of their ships as were in sound condition, (the rest having been burnt by the inhabitants,) and then sent Hippocrates and Epicles to Euboea, to fetch the squadron that was there.