History of the Peloponnesian War
Thucydides
Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.
And this he thought was his shortest way of bringing the war to a conclusion; for he would either gain possession of Syracuse by succeeding in his design, or lead back the armament, and not exhaust for no purpose both the Athenians who joined the expedition and the whole state.
In the first place, then, the Athenians went out and ravaged a part of the Syracusan territory, about the Anapus, and were superior in force, as they had originally been, both by land and by sea: (for in neither way did the Syracusans come out against them, except with their cavalry and dart-men from the Olympieum.)
Afterwards, Demosthenes resolved first to make an attempt on the counter-work with engines. But when the engines, after he had brought them up, were burnt by the enemy who were making a defence from the wall, and they were beaten back when charging at many points with the rest of his forces, he determined to delay no longer; but having gained the assent of Nicias and the rest of his colleagues, according to the plan he had formed, he proceeded to the attempt on Epipolae.