History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

The crew of the Salaminia for some time made search for Alcibiades and his companions, but when they were no where to be found, they departed on their voyage back. Alcibiades therefore, being now an outlaw, crossed not long after on board a boat from Thurii to the Peloponnese: and the Athenians, [*](ἐρήμῃ δίκῃ] Literally, by a deserted, or abandoned trial. See Herman, Pol. Ant. 144.) when they were not forthcoming, passed sentence of death upon him and those with him.

After these things, the remaining generals of the Athenians in Sicily, having made two divisions of the army, and each taken by lot one of them, sailed with the whole force for Selinus and Segesta; wishing to know whether the Segestans would give the promised money, and at the same time to inspect the condition of the Selinuntines, and to learn the state of their differences with the Segestans.

And so coasting along Sicily, with the shore on their left hand, on the side towards the Tyrrhene gulf, they landed at Himera, which is the only Grecian city in that part of the island. When they would not receive them, they proceeded on their voyage;

and as they coasted along, took Hyccara, which, though a Sicanian town, was engaged in war with the Segestans, and was a petty sea-port. Having taken the inhabitants of the town for slaves, they gave it up to the Segestans, (for some of their cavalry had joined them,) and they themselves returned by land through the country of the Sicels, till they came to Catana; while their ships sailed along the coast with the prisoners on board.

Nicias, however, coasted along straightway from Hyccara to Segesta; and after transacting his other business, and receiving thirty talents, rejoined the forces. They then sold their slaves, from which were realized a hundred and twenty talents;

and sailed round to the allies of the Sicels, giving orders to send them troops. With half of their own force, too, they went against Hybla, in the territory of Gela, which was hostile to them; but did not take it. And thus the summer ended.

The following winter, the Athenians at once began to prepare for their advance upon Syracuse, and the Syracusans also, on their side, for marching against them.

For when they did not, in accordance with their first alarm and expectation, attack them immediately; as every day went on, they regained their courage more. And when they were seen to be sailing on the other side of Sicily, far away from them, and had gone to Hybla, and made an attempt on it without taking it by storm, they despised them still more, and called on their generals—acting as a multitude is wont to do when full of confidence—to lead them against Catana, since the enemy would not come to them.

Moreover, Syracusan parties of horse, sent out to reconnoitre, were continually riding up to the Athenian armament, and asking them, amongst other insulting expressions, whether they had come themselves to settle with them in a strange country, rather than to reinstate the Leontini.

The Athenian generals were acquainted with these things, and wished to draw them as far as possible from their city with their whole force, and themselves, in the mean time, to coast along with their ships by night, and quietly occupy a place for encampment in a favourable position; knowing that [*](οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως δυνηθέντες καὶ εἰ] Poppo, Göller, and Bloomfield, all bracket the καὶ in this passage, as utterly marring the sense of it; while Arnold only objects to the interpretation of the Scholiast, without attempting to explain it himself. In support of the translation which I have ventured to give, compare I. 143. 4, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἔσται πελοποννήσου μέροςτι τμηθῆναι καὶ τὴν ʼαττικὴν ἅπασαν, and VII. 28. 4, αἱ μὲν γὰρ δαπάναιοὐχ ὁμοίως καὶ πρὶν, ἀλλὰ πολλῷ μείζους καθέστασαν, κ. τ. λ. In the latter passage the idea of excess is distinctly asserted, after being previously implied, as in the other passages, by the words οὐχ ὁμοίως καί.) so they would be better able to do it, than if they should land from their ships in face of an enemy prepared to receive them, or should be known to be going by land; (for the Syracusan horse, which was numerous, while they themselves had none, would do great mischief to their light-armed and mob of campfollowers;) and that thus they would take a position where they would not be annoyed by the cavalry in a degree worth speaking of; (for some Syracusan exiles who accompanied them told them of the spot near the Olympieum, which they actually occupied.) The generals, therefore, adopted the following stratagem in furtherance of their wishes.