History of the Peloponnesian War

It was an Athenian fortress on the borders of Boeotia, and the Corinthians, having called to their aid the Boeotians, were besieging it on their own account, because of a misfortune they had suffered at the hands of the garrison at Oenoe when they lost some men as they were returning from Deceleia.

So Aristarchus, after first making his plans known to the besiegers, deceived the garrison at Oenoe by telling them that their partisans in the city had made terms with the Lacedaemonians, and that, among other things, this garrison must surrender the place to the Boeotians; for the agreement had been made on these conditions. The garrison trusted him because he was a general, being in complete ignorance because they were in a state of siege, and evacuated the fort under a truce.

In this manner Oenoe was taken and occupied by the Boeotians, and thus the oligarchy at Athens and the struggle between the factions came to an end.

During this summer, about the same time as these events, the situation of the Peloponnesians in Miletus was as follows:[*](The general purport; there is no verb in the text for the subject οἱ τῇ μιλήτῳ πελοπονήσιοι. After the long parenthesis the subject is resumed in οὕτω δὴ ὁ μίνδαρος, “In these circumstances, then, Mindarus.”) None of the officers appointed by Tissaphernes at the time when he went to Aspendus would give them maintenance, and neither the Phoenician ships nor Tissaphernes himself had yet come; Philippus, who had been sent with him,[*](cf. 8.87.6.) and also another person, a Spartan named Hippocrates who was at Phaselis, had written letters to Mindarus, the admiral, saving that the ships would never come and that they were being wronged in all things by Tissaphernes; moreover, Pharnabazus was inviting them to come and was eager, when he should have got the assistance of the Peloponnesian fleet, to do just what Tissaphernes was to have done and to cause the rest of the cities within his province to revolt from the Athenians, hoping to gain some advantage thereby. In these circumstances, then, Mindarus put off from Miletus, in good order and, giving his fleet the command without previous notice that his move might not become known to the Athenians at Samos, he sailed for the Hellespont with seventy-three ships; for earlier in this same summer sixteen ships had sailed thither and had overrun a portion of the Chersonesus. Mindarus, however, was caught by a storm and forced to make harbour at Icarus; there he remained five or six days by reason of bad weather and then went on to Chios.

When Thrasyllus heard that Mindarus had put to sea from Miletus, he also sailed at once from Samos with fifty-five ships, making all haste that the enemy might not enter the Hellespont before him.

But learning that Mindarus was at Chios and believing that he could keep him there, he posted scouts both at Lesbos and on the mainland opposite, in order that, if the enemy's ships should make a move in any direction, he should have knowledge of it; as for himself, he sailed along the coast to Methymna, and gave orders to prepare barley-meal and general provisions, with the idea that, if a considerable time elapsed, he would use Lesbos as a base for attacks upon Chios. At the same time, since Eresus in Lesbos had revolted, he wished to sail against it and take it if possible.

For some exiles who had been driven out of Methymna, and those the most influential citizens, had brought over from Cyme about fifty hoplites that had been taken into their clubs, had hired still others from the mainland, and now with these troops, about three hundred in all, commanded by Anaxarchus a Theban on the strength of kinship,[*](cf. 8.5.2, where the Boeotians support the Lesbians in their application to Agis for assistance; also iii. 2, where the Boeotians are said to be kinsmen of the Mytilenaeans.) had made an attack upon Methymna first; and when they had been foiled in this attempt by the timely arrival of the Athenian garrison in Mytilene, and had been again repulsed in a battle fought outside the walls, they had made their way over the mountain and had brought about the revolt of Eresus.

Thrasyllus therefore now sailed thither with all his fleet, intending to assault the town. Thrasybulus also had already arrived there from Samos with five ships, after word had been brought to him of the crossing of the exiles; but being too late to save Eresus, he had merely anchored there on his arrival.

The Athenian fleet was likewise reinforced by two vessels that were returning home from the Hellespont and by five[*](Or, reading αἱ μηθυμναῖαι, with B, “(all) the Methymnaean ships.”) Methymnaean ships, so that there were present in all sixty-five ships. It was with the troops from these ships that they were preparing to take Eresus by assault, with the aid of engines or in any way they could.

Meanwhile Mindarus and the Peloponnesian ships at Chios, having spent only two days in provisioning and having received from the Chians three Chian tessaracosts[*](Literally “fortieths” of some local coin, possibly the golden stater; about 4d.; 8 cents.) for each man, on the third day set sail in all haste from Chios, avoiding the open sea that they might not fall in with the Athenian fleet at Eresus, but keeping Lesbos on their left, and making for the mainland.

They first touched at the harbour of Cartereia in the territory of Phocaea, where they dined, and then, sailing along the Cymaean coast, supped at Arginussae[*](If τῆς ἠπείρου is genuine, there must have been a town Arginussae on the mainland opposite the islands of that Name. The Schol. on Ar. Frags. 33 mentions a town Arginusa. Deleting τῆς ἠπείρου, as Krüger suggests, we should have, “at the Arginussae, opposite Mytilene.” With Hude's text (adding καὶ) the meaning would be that they supped, some at the islands, others on the mainland.) on the mainland opposite Mytilene.