History of the Peloponnesian War
Thucydides
Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.
And as for the other states, which before they revolted used to lavish money upon the Athenians, he said that they were doing wrong unless they were willing at this time also to contribute as much or even more for their own protection.
And he further explained that, though Tissaphernes, now that he was waging war on his own resources, was quite properly frugal, yet if ever supplies should come down from the King he would give the men their full pay and would render to the states all reasonable aid.
Alcibiades also urged Tissaphernes not to be too eager to bring the war to an end, nor to take such a course, either by bringing there the Phoenician fleet which he was equipping or by providing pay for a larger number of Hellenes, as would give the command of both the land and the sea to the same people, but to let the dominion be divided between the two sides, so that it would be possible for the King to lead the one party or the other against those that were troublesome to him.
But if the dominion of both land and sea were united, the King himself would have no one with whom he could co-operate in destroying the stronger, and would have no alternative but sooner or later to rise up himself[*](The word ἀναστὰς seems to be used because Alcibiades has in mind the ἔφεδρος or third combatant in the games, who sits by to fight the victor. The policy he urges is that the King should sit by while the Athenians and Lacedaemonians fight and weaken each other, as otherwise he may have to “enter the ring” against a strong opponent.) and, at great expense and risk, fight a decisive struggle. The cheaper course was this—at a small fraction of the expense and at the same time with security to himself to wear the Hellenes out one upon the other.