History of the Peloponnesian War

When the news reached Athens, even though the actual soldiers who had escaped from the action itself gave a clear report, they for long refused to believe that the armament could have been so utterly destroyed. When, however, they were convinced, they were angry with the orators who had taken part in promoting the expedition—as though they had not voted for it themselves—and they were also enraged at the oracle-mongers and soothsayers and whoever at that time by any practice of divination had led them to hope that they would conquer Sicily.

Everything indeed on every side distressed them, and after what had happened they were beset with fear and utmost consternation. For having lost, both each man separately and as a state, many hoplites and horsemen and the flower of the youth, while they saw none like it left them, they were heavy of heart; and again, seeing no ships in the docks in sufficient number nor money in the treasury nor crews for the ships, they were at the moment hopeless of safety. They thought that their enemies in Sicily would sail with their fleet straight for the Peiraeus, especially as they had won so great a victory, and that their foes at home, now doubly prepared in all respects, would attack them at once with all their might both by land and by sea, and that their own allies would revolt and join them.

Nevertheless it was their opinion that, as far as their present circumstances permitted, they should not give up, but should both make ready a fleet, providing timber and money from whatever source they could, and put their relations with their allies, and especially with Euboea, on a safe footing; moreover, that they should reduce the expenses of the city to an economical basis, and should select a board of elderly men who should prepare measures with reference to the present situation as there might be occasion.

In the panic of the moment they were ready, as is the way with a democracy, to observe discipline in everything. And as they had determined, so they proceeded to act; and the summer ended.

The following winter, in view of the great disaster that had befallen the Athenians in Sicily,[*](Nov., 413 B.C.) there was at once excitement among all the Hellenes. Some, who were allies of neither party, thought that, even if they were not called upon for aid, they should no longer hold aloof from the war, but should go of their own accord against the Athenians; for they believed, one and all, that the Athenians would have come against them if they had succeeded in Sicily; they also believed that the rest of the war would be short and that it would be glorious to have a part in it. The allies of the Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, were more than ever animated by a common eagerness quickly to be relieved of

their great hardships. But most of all the subjects of the Athenians were ready, even beyond their power, to revolt from them, because they judged of the situation under the influence of passion and would not even leave them the plea that they would be able to hold out through