History of the Peloponnesian War
Thucydides
Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.
Nicias, perceiving this and seeing the enemy's strength and his own perplexities increasing day by day, on his part also sent word to Athens on many occasions, giving detailed reports of what was happening, and especially now, because he thought that they were in a critical situation and that there was no hope of safety unless the Athenians, with all possible speed, should either recall them or send out reinforcements in no small numbers.
But fearing that his messengers might not report the actual facts, either through inability to speak or from lapse of memory,[*](Or, reading γνώμης “from want of intelligence.”) or because they wanted to please the crowd, wrote a letter, thinking that in this way the Athenians would best learn his own view, obscured in no way by any fault on the part of the messenger, and could thus deliberate about the true situation.
So the messengers whom he sent departed, bearing the letter and the verbal reports which they were to deliver; but as regards the camp, the object of his care was now rather to keep on the defensive than to run voluntary risks.
At the end of the same summer Euetion, an Athenian general, made in concert with Perdiccas an expedition against Amphipolis with a large force of Thracians, and though he failed to take the city, brought some triremes round into the Strymon and blockaded it from the river, using Himeraeum as his base. So the summer ended.
The following winter the messengers of Nicias, on reaching Athens, gave the messages which they had been ordered to give by word of mouth, answering any questions that were asked, and delivered the letter. And the clerk of the city came before the Athenians and read them the letter, which ran as follows:
"What has been done before this, Athenians, you have been informed in many earlier letters; but now it is more than ever the time for you to learn in what condition we are and then to take counsel.
When in most of our battles we had beaten the Syracusans, against whom we were sent, and had built the fortifications in which we now are, there came Gylippus, a Lacedaemonian, with an army collected from the Peloponnesus and from some of the cities in Sicily. In the first battle he was defeated by us, but on the next day, under pressure from their numerous cavalry and javelin-men, we drew back within our walls.
At the present time, then, we have discontinued our work of circumvallation on account of the superior numbers of the enemy and are keeping quiet; for we cannot use our whole army because the guarding of the walls has absorbed a part of our heavy-armed force. The enemy meanwhile have built a single wall past ours, so that it is no longer possible to invest them, unless one should assault this counter-wall with a large force and take it.
So it has turned out that we, who are supposed to be besieging others, are rather ourselves under siege, at least by land; for we cannot even go far into the country because of their cavalry.