History of the Peloponnesian War
Thucydides
Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.
Moreover, the Syracusans were manning a fleet and practising with a view to trying their hand at sea also; and in general they were much encouraged.
Nicias, perceiving this and seeing the enemy's strength and his own perplexities increasing day by day, on his part also sent word to Athens on many occasions, giving detailed reports of what was happening, and especially now, because he thought that they were in a critical situation and that there was no hope of safety unless the Athenians, with all possible speed, should either recall them or send out reinforcements in no small numbers.
But fearing that his messengers might not report the actual facts, either through inability to speak or from lapse of memory,[*](Or, reading γνώμης “from want of intelligence.”) or because they wanted to please the crowd, wrote a letter, thinking that in this way the Athenians would best learn his own view, obscured in no way by any fault on the part of the messenger, and could thus deliberate about the true situation.
So the messengers whom he sent departed, bearing the letter and the verbal reports which they were to deliver; but as regards the camp, the object of his care was now rather to keep on the defensive than to run voluntary risks.
At the end of the same summer Euetion, an Athenian general, made in concert with Perdiccas an expedition against Amphipolis with a large force of Thracians, and though he failed to take the city, brought some triremes round into the Strymon and blockaded it from the river, using Himeraeum as his base. So the summer ended.