History of the Peloponnesian War
Thucydides
Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.
The Athenians came against this country in the first place for the enslavement of Sicily, and after that, if they should be successful, for that of the Peloponnesus also and the rest of Hellas, having already acquired a dominion greater than that of any Hellenes either of the past or of the present time; but you, the first men who ever withstood their fleet, with which they had obtained the mastery everywhere, have already defeated them on the sea and in all probability will defeat them in this present battle.
For when men have once suffered abatement just where they claim to be superior, what is left of their self-esteem is weaker than it ever was —than if they had never thought themselves superior at all—and their pride being mortified by the disappointment,[*](Or “unexpectedly deceived in their self-confidence.”) they give way out of all proportion to their actual strength. And at the present moment this is what the Athenians have probably suffered.
"With us, however, the feeling that before animated us, which led us, even though we were inexperienced, to venture our all, is now more fully confirmed; and since there has been added to it the conviction that we are strongest, because we have defeated the strongest, the hope of each man is doubled. And, generally speaking, the greatest hope inspires in men the greatest zeal for their undertakings.
Furthermore, as regards their imitation of our arrangements, whereas these are familiar to us as a part of our manner of fighting and we shall be able to adapt ourselves to meet each one of them, yet from their point of view, as soon as they find many hoplites upon their decks, contrary to their established usage, and many javelin-men also, landlubbers so to speak—Acarnanians and others— put aboard ships, men who will not even know how to discharge their darts sitting down,[*](For such men would not be able to stand up on deck.) will they not inevitably imperil their ships and all be in confusion among themselves, as they move about in a fashion not their own?
Even by the superior number of their ships they will not be profited—in case any one among you has become afraid from the fact that he will have to fight against an unequal number; for in a small space a large number of ships will be slower to carry out any action they may plan, but very easily damaged by the devices which we have adopted. But if you seek the absolute truth, learn it from intelligence which we consider certain:
it is through the overwhelming character of their misfortunes and because they are compelled by their present difficulties, that they have reached the desperate resolution—trusting more to fortune than to their own preparation—of risking a battle in whatever way they can, in order that they may either force their way out and sail away, or after defeat may make their retreat by land; for they know that in any case they could not fare worse than at present.
“Against a disorderly array like this, therefore, and against the fortune of our bitterest foes that has surrendered itself into our hands, let us give battle with fury; and let us consider that against enemies it is a most lawful act if for the punishment of the aggressor anyone thinks fit to glut his heart's animosity; and again, that vengeance on foes will be within our power—and that, as the proverb has it, is of all things the sweetest.