History of the Peloponnesian War

The Syracusans, on the other hand, were aided by the Camarinaeans,[*](cf. 6.67.2; 7.33.1.) who were their next neighbours, and the Geloans, who lived next to the Camarinaeans;

then, since the Agrigentines were neutral,[*](cf. 7.33.2.) by the Selinuntians,[*](cf. 6.6.2, 6..1, 6.67.2.) who were settled in the country beyond. All these occupied that part of Sicily which faces Libya, but the Himeraeans[*](cf. 7.1.2; 7.1.3.) came from the part which faces the Tyrrhenian Sea, where they were the only Hellenic inhabitants; and they alone from that region came to the aid of the Syracusans.

Such were the Hellenic peoples in Sicily, all Dorians and independent, that fought on their side; but of Barbarians, the Sicels alone—those, that is, that had not gone over to the side of the Athenians. Of the Hellenes outside of Sicily there were the Lacedaemonians, who furnished a Spartan as commander-in-chief, but no troops except Neodamodes[*](See on 7.19.3.) and Helots; the Corinthians, who alone were at hand with both a fleet and a land-force; the Leucadians and Ambraciots, both induced by the tie of kinship;[*](Syracuse (6.3.2), Leucas (1.30.2) and Ambracia (2.80.3) were sister states having Corinth as μητρόπολις.) from Arcadia[*](cf. 7.19.4.) mercenaries sent by the Corinthians; the Sicyonians, who served under compulsion;[*](Because since 418 B.C. an oligarchic constitution had been forced upon them (5.81.2).) and, from outside the Peloponnesus, the Boeotians.[*](cf. 7.19.3.)

As compared with all these, who came from abroad, the Siceliots themselves supplied a greater number of troops of every kind, inasmuch as the cities they inhabited were large; and in fact the forces they collected comprised hoplites in large numbers, as well as ships, horses, and a miscellaneous horde of vast numbers. And again, in comparison with all the rest, speaking roughly, the Syracusans themselves provided the larger number, both on account of the greatness of their city and because they were in the greatest danger.

Such were the forces that had been brought together for the assistance of either side, and at this time[*](The latter part of the summer of 413 B.C.) both had all their contingents at hand, and no further reinforcements came to either.

The Syracusans and their allies, then, naturally conceived the thought that it would be a glorious achievement for them to crown the victory which they had won in the sea-fight by taking the whole vast armament of the Athenians and preventing their escape in either way, either by sea or by land.

Accordingly, they began at once to close the entrance to the Great Harbour, which was about eight stadia wide, with triremes ranged broadside and with large and small boats, mooring them at anchor; and they made other preparations in case the Athenians should still venture to fight at sea, and there was nothing small about any of the designs they formed.

But the Athenians, observing the closing of the harbour and being aware of the general plans of the enemy, thought it desirable to hold a council.

So the generals and the taxiarchs came together and took counsel with reference to the difficulties which now confronted them both in other ways, and especially owing to the fact that they no longer had supplies for their immediate needs—for in the expectation that they would sail away they had already sent word to Catana and stopped the bringing in of provisions—and were not likely to have them in the future, unless they should hold the mastery at sea. They determined, therefore, to abandon their upper walls,[*](ie. the upper extremity of their lines, under the bluffs of Epipolae and furthest from the harbour.) and cutting off by means of a cross-wall the smallest possible space, close to the ships, that would suffice for the stores and for the sick, to put a garrison in this: they would then take the rest of their land-force and man all their ships, not only those which were fit for service, but also the less seaworthy, putting aboard every available man, and fight the issue out at sea; if they won, they would proceed to Catana, but if not, they would burn their ships, and, forming in line of battle, make their retreat by land, taking whatever route would enable them soonest to reach some friendly place, whether Barbarian or Hellenic.

These plans having once been determined upon, they acted accordingly: they descended stealthily from the upper walls and manned all their ships, compelling everyone to embark who, provided lie was of military age, seemed to be at all fit for service.

So there were manned altogether about one hundred and ten ships; and they put on board a large number of archers and javelin-men, both of the Acarnanians and of the other foreigners,[*](The reference is to contingents from peoples who, like the Acarnanians, were not under the Athenian empire but served for pay; cf. 7.57.10.) and in general they made such provision as was possible under the stress of necessity and with the object they had in view.