History of the Peloponnesian War

The Syracusans, having sunk seven of the Athenian ships and damaged many others, and having taken prisoner most of the men upon them and killed the rest, then withdrew and set up a trophy for both the sea-fights. They now cherished the confident belief that they were far superior to the Athenians on the sea, and they thought that they should get the better of the army on land as well. So they, on their part, proceeded to make preparations to attack the enemy again on both elements.

At this juncture, however, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the reinforcements from Athens, consisting of about seventy-three ships, including the foreign vessels, and nearly five thousand hoplites, both Athenian and allied, and not a few Barbarian and Hellenic javelin-men, slingers, and bowmen, together with an adequate supply of other equipment. The Syracusans and their allies were seized with no little consternation at the moment, wondering if they were never to have any final deliverance from their peril;

for they saw that in spite of the fortification of Deceleia an army equal or nearly equal to the first one had come to reinforce it, and that the power of the Athenians was apparently great in all directions. The first Athenian army, on the other hand, had, considering their past misfortunes,[*](Or, “by a natural rebound after their misfortunes.”) recovered a certain confidence. Demosthenes, seeing how matters stood, was of the opinion that it would not do to waste time and thus invite the same experience that Nicias had met with.

For Nicias when he first came inspired terror; but as he did not immediately attack Syracuse but spent the winter at Catana, he came to be despised, and Gylippus forestalled him by coming from the Peloponnesus with an army. This force the Syracusans would not even have sent for if he had attacked without delay; for they would have supposed that they could cope with him unaided, and would not, therefore, have discovered that they were too weak until they had been completely walled in, so that, even if they had sent for reinforcements then, these would no longer have availed them to the same extent. Demosthenes, therefore, taking these facts into consideration and realizing that he also at the present time was most formidable to his opponents on the very first day after his arrival, wished at the earliest possible moment to reap the full benefit of their present consternation at his army.

Accordingly, seeing that the Syracusan cross-wall, by which they had prevented the Athenians from completing their investment, was a single one, and that, if one should get control of the ascent to Epipolae and after that of the camp upon it, the wall itself could easily be taken—for the enemy would not then stand his ground against them—

he was eager to make the attempt. He thought this to be the shortest way to end the war; for he would either be successful and take Syracuse, or else would lead his army home and not wear out to no purpose both the Athenians who took part in the expedition and the entire state.

In the first place, then, the Athenians went out and proceeded to ravage the land of the Syracusans in the region of the Anapus river, and at this time, as at first, they had the upper hand with their army both by land and by sea; for on neither element did the Syracusans come out to meet them except with their cavalry and javelin-men from the Olympieium.

Afterwards it seemed best to Demosthenes, before going further, to make an attempt with engines upon the cross-wall. But when he brought his engines up they were burned by the enemy, who defended themselves from the wall, and the assaults which he made at many points with the rest of his army were regularly repulsed; it therefore seemed best not to waste more time, and so with the consent of Nicias and his other colleagues he undertook, as he had planned, the attack upon Epipolae.