History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.

for it would not be possible for the Athenians, if forced out of line, to back water in any other direction than towards the land, and that, too, for only a short distance and to a short stretch of shore—the space in front of their own camp—inasmuch as the Syracusans would command the rest of the harbour.

And the enemy, if they were forced to yield at any point, would be driven together into a small space and all to the same point, so that they would fall foul of each other and be thrown into confusion—the very thing that caused the Athenians most damage in all the fighting there, since it was not possible for them, as it was for the Syracusans, to back water to any part of the harbour. The Syracusans saw, moreover, that the Athenians would not be able to sail round into open water, since they themselves would control not only their entrance into the harbour from the sea outside, but also their backing out of the harbour into the sea, especially as Plemmyrium would be hostile to them and the mouth of the harbour was not large.

Such were the devices adopted by the Syracusans as appropriate to their own skill and strength, and at the same time they had now gained greater confidence as the result of the former sea-fight;

so they made their preparations to attack simultaneously by land and by sea. And a short time before the fleet left its station Gylippus led out the land-force from the city and brought it up against that part of the Athenians' wall that faced the city; and the troops stationed at the Olympieium —all the hoplites that were there and the cavalry and the light-armed forces of the Syracusans— advanced against the wall from the other side; and immediately after this the ships of the Syracusans and their allies sailed out against the Athenian fleet.

The Athenians, who at first thought that the enemy would make an attempt with his land-forces only, were thrown into confusion when they saw the ships also suddenly bearing down upon them. Some arrayed themselves upon the walls and in front of them to meet their assailants there; others went out to confront the forces that were rapidly advancing from the Olympieium and the country outside, consisting of cavalry in large numbers and javelin-men; and still others began to man the ships or to run down to the beach to give aid. And when the vessels were manned they put out to meet the Syracusans with seventy-five ships; the ships of the Syracusans numbering about eighty.

But after they had skirmished with one another for a great part of the day, advancing and backing away, and neither side was able to win any advantage worth mentioning, except that the Syracusans sank one or two of the Athenian ships, they separated;

and the land-force at the same time withdrew from the walls. On the next day the Syracusans kept quiet, giving no indication of what they would do next. Nicias, on the other hand, seeing that the issue of the sea-fight had been a draw and expecting the enemy to attack again, compelled the trierarchs to repair their ships, in case any had suffered damage, and anchored merchant-ships in front of the Athenian stockade, which had been planted in the sea in front of their ships to serve in place of an enclosed harbour.

These merchant-ships he placed at intervals of about two hundred feet from one another, in order that any ships which should be hard pressed might find safe refuge inside and again sail out at leisure. In these preparations the Athenians spent the whole day until nightfall.