History of the Peloponnesian War

And the Athenians also sent twenty ships round the Peloponnesus, to see that no one should cross over from Corinth and the Peloponnesus to Sicily.

For the Corinthians, when the Syracusan envoys arrived and reported that the situation in Sicily was more favourable, felt much greater confidence than before, thinking that their former despatch of the fleet had been well timed, and accordingly not only were they themselves preparing to send hoplites to Sicily in merchant-ships, but also the Lacedaemonians were intending in the same manner to despatch troops from the rest of the Peloponnesus.

The Corinthians were also manning twenty-five ships, in order that they might try an engagement with the squadron on watch at Naupactus[*](The Athenian squadron, generally twenty triremes, stationed on guard here during the whole war; cf. 2.69.1.; lxxx. 4) and that the Athenians at Naupactus might not find it so easy to prevent their merchant-vessels from putting to sea, since they would be busy keeping watch upon the triremes arrayed against them.

The Lacedaemonians were also making ready for their invasion of Attica, both in accordance with their previous resolution and because the Syracusans and Corinthians urged it, when they heard of the reinforcements to be sent from the Athenians to Sicily, so that, as they said, these might be wholly prevented by the invasion. And Alcibiades was likewise insistently telling them that they should fortify Deceleia and not relax their efforts in the war.

But most important of all was the fact that a degree of confidence had come to the Lacedaemonians, because they believed that the Athenians, once they had on their hands a twofold war—with themselves and with the Siceliots—would be more easily overthrown, and because they regarded the Athenians as having been the first to break the treaty. In the former war[*](The Archidamian War, or the first decade of the Peloponnesian War.) they felt that the transgression had been rather on their own part; for the Thebans had entered Plataea in time of truce,[*](cf. 2.2.1.) and, although it had been stipulated in the former agreements[*](Referring to Thirty Years' Truce; cf. 1.115.1.) that neither party was to resort to arms if the other were willing to submit the question to arbitration, yet they themselves refused to respond to the summons when the Athenians invited them to arbitrate. On this account they considered that they deserved their misfortune, having in mind both the disaster at Pylos[*](iv. 26-41.) and any other that had befallen them.