History of the Peloponnesian War

And if but one advantage more shall be gained by the enemy—that the regions of Italy which supply us with food, seeing in what plight we are and that you are not sending reinforcements, should go over to the enemy—the war will be all over for them without a battle, for we shall be besieged into surrender. "I could have written you things more pleasant than these, but certainly not more useful, if you are to have full knowledge of the situation here before deciding upon your course;

and, besides, knowing as I do your tempers—that you do indeed prefer to hear what is most pleasant, but afterwards find fault if the results are in any respect disappointing—I have thought it safer to reveal the truth.

“And now I beg you to believe that neither your soldiers nor your generals have been blameworthy so far as concerns the original objects of our expedition; but since all Sicily is united and the enemy expects another army from the Peloponnesus, decide at once upon a course of action, knowing that the troops which are now here are not a match even for the enemy which at present confronts us, but that you must either recall these or send to reinforce it another armament equally large, both army and fleet, and no small amount of money; and you must send a general to relieve me, since I am unable to remain because of a disease of the kidneys.

And I submit that I have a claim upon your indulgence, for when I was strong I served you well in many a position of command. But whatever you intend to do, do it promptly at the opening of spring and without postponements, knowing that the enemy will procure fresh resources, some near at hand in Sicily, and others from the Peloponnesus, and that these last, though they will arrive less promptly, nevertheless, if you do not take care, will either elude you as they did before, or else outstrip you.”

Such were the disclosures made by the letter of Nicias. But when the Athenians heard it read, they did not relieve Nicias of his command, but in order that he might not to have to face his difficulties alone while in ill-health, they chose two men who were on the spot, Menander and Euthydemus,[*](Already mentioned as one of those who signed the treaty of Nicias, 422 B.C.; cf. 5.19.2; 5.24.1.) to assist him until the arrival of the other two who should be chosen as his colleagues. And they voted to send another armament, both land-force and fleet, to be recruited from the Athenians on the muster-roll and from the allies.

And as colleagues for Nicias they elected Demosthenes[*](Last mentioned in active service in iv. 66-69.) son of Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon[*](He had been fined after the unsuccessful expedition to Sicily in 424 B. C.; cf. 4.65.3.) son of Thucles. Eurymedon was despatched to Sicily immediately, about the time of the winter solstice, with ten ships; and he took with him one hundred and twenty talents of silver,[*](£24,000; $116,640.) and at the same time bore a message to the army in Sicily that reinforcements would come and that care would be taken of them.

But Demosthenes remained behind and busied himself with preparations for his departure, which he planned to make at the opening of spring, sending to the allies requisitions for troops and getting ready at home money and ships and hoplites.

And the Athenians also sent twenty ships round the Peloponnesus, to see that no one should cross over from Corinth and the Peloponnesus to Sicily.

For the Corinthians, when the Syracusan envoys arrived and reported that the situation in Sicily was more favourable, felt much greater confidence than before, thinking that their former despatch of the fleet had been well timed, and accordingly not only were they themselves preparing to send hoplites to Sicily in merchant-ships, but also the Lacedaemonians were intending in the same manner to despatch troops from the rest of the Peloponnesus.