History of the Peloponnesian War
Thucydides
Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.
And the war here you must at the same time prosecute more openly, in order that the Syracusans, convinced that you are really concerned, may offer greater resistance, and the Athenians be less able to send reinforcements to their own troops.
You ought likewise to fortify Deceleia in Attica,[*](The occupation of Deceleia took place in 413 B.C. (cf. 1.xix.).) the very thing the Athenians are always most in dread of and reckon the only peril of which they have not made full trial in this war. And the surest way in which anyone can hurt his enemies is this: acting on certain information, he should inflict upon them that which he perceives they most fear; for it is natural that every man should have the most accurate knowledge of his own dangers and should fear them accordingly.
But as to the benefits which you yourselves will gain by this menacing stronghold[*](ie. a fortress built to dominate an enemy's territory.) and will prevent your opponents from obtaining, I will pass over many and sum up only the most important. Whatever their country is stocked with will for the most part come into your hands, either by capture or by voluntary surrender.[*](αὐτόατα, refers to slaves, who were part of the “stock.”) And the revenues of the Laureian silver mines and whatever profits they now derive from their land and from their courts,[*](The fees and fines arising from the adjudication of cases brought by the allied states.) they will at once be deprived of, and above all of the tribute from their allies, that would be less regularly brought in; for these, convinced that the war is now being prosecuted on your part with all your might, will take their obligations lightly.