History of the Peloponnesian War

It was the judgment of Nicias that they should sail with their whole armament against Selinus, which was the object for which they had chiefly been sent out, and if the Egestaeans should furnish money for the whole army, they should then determine accordingly; otherwise, they should demand that they give maintenance for sixty ships, the number they had asked for, and remaining there they should reconcile the Selinuntians to the Egestaeans, either by force or by agreement. This being accomplished, the Athenians should sail along by the other cities, displaying the power of the city of Athens and making manifest their zeal towards their friends and allies, and then should sail back home—unless perchance they should be able quickly and unexpectedly either to aid the Leontines, or to bring over some of the other cities—and not imperil the safety of the state at the expense of their own resources.[*](As opposed to those of the Egestaeans.)

Alcibiades insisted that they ought not, after sailing out with so great an armament, to go back in disgrace without effecting anything; but urged rather that they send heralds to the other cities, except Selinus and Syracuse, and try to detach some of the Sicels from the Syracusans, and to make friends of others, in order that these might furnish grain and troops, but first of all that they try to persuade the Messenians; for their city, he urged, was most conveniently situated on a line of traffic[*](ἐν πόρῳ is used of the position of Corinth, 1.120.2.) and at the approach to Sicily and would be a harbour and a most suitable watch-station for the armament. Then, after they had brought over these cities and knew with whose assistance they would carry on the war, they should proceed to attack Syracuse and Selinus, unless the latter came to terms with the Egestaeans, and the former permitted them to restore the Leontines.

Lamachus maintained that they ought to sail direct for Syracuse and as soon as possible make the fight near the city, while the Syracusans were still unprepared and their consternation was at its height.

For every army, lie argued, is always most formidable at first, but if it delay before coming into sight, men recover their spirit and even at the sight of it are more inclined to despise than to fear it. But if it attack suddenly, while the enemy are still in terror of its coming, it will have the best chance for victory and in every way will strike fear into them, both by the sight of it—for at this moment it would appear most numerous—and by the expectation of the fate in store for them, but most of all by the immediate peril of the battle.

And, he added, probably many people have been left behind on their farms outside the city on account of the disbelief that the Athenians will come, and while they are bringing in their property the army will not lack supplies, if it once controls the land and invests the city.