History of the Peloponnesian War

If, however, anyone does find my words credible, let him not be dismayed at their daring and power. For neither will they be able to inflict more injury upon us than they will suffer, nor is it without advantage for us that they are coming with a great armament; on the contrary, it is far better so as regards the rest of the Siceliots, for in their consternation they will be more inclined to join our alliance; and if in the end we either overpower them or drive them off baffled in their designs—for I certainly have no fear as to their attaining the success they anticipate —it will prove the most glorious of achievements for us, and one which I at least do not despair of.

For few great armaments, whether of Hellenes or of barbarians, when sent far from their own land, have been successful. The reason is that they are not, in the first place, superior in numbers to the people against whom they go and the neighbours of these— for fear always brings about union; and if, in the second place, they fail on account of lack of supplies in a foreign land, they leave a proud name to those whom they plotted against, even though their failure be due chiefly to themselves.

These very Athenians, for example, when the Persians contrary to expectation signally failed, grew great on the repute that it was Athens they went against; so in our case a like issue is not beyond hope.