History of the Peloponnesian War

And so it turned out. For when, on coming before the popular assembly and being asked whether they had come with full powers, they answered “No,” contrary to what they had said in the senate, the Athenians could endure it no longer, but hearkened to Alcibiades, who inveighed against the Lacedaemonians far more than before, and were ready at once to bring in the Argives and their confederates and conclude an alliance. But before anything was ratified an earthquake occurred, and this assembly was adjourned.

In the assembly on the next day, however, Nicias, although, as the Lacedaemonians had themselves been deceived, so he too had been deceived in the matter of their admission that they had not come with full powers, nevertheless still maintained that they ought to become friends with the Lacedaemonians rather than with the Argives; and accordingly he proposed that, deferring the question of the Argive alliance, they should again send envoys to the Lacedaemonians and find out what their intentions were. He urged the view that the postponement of hostile operations was honourable for themselves but humiliating for the Lacedaemonians; for as matters stood well for themselves, it was best to preserve their good fortune as long as possible, whereas for the Lacedaemonians, who were in hard luck, it would be clear gain to risk a decisive contest as quickly as possible.

So he persuaded them to send envoys, himself being one, to urge the Lacedaemonians, if they had any just intentions, to restore Panactum intact and Amphipolis, and to give up the alliance with the Boeotians—unless these should accede to the treaty—in accordance with the stipulation which had been arrived at that neither should enter into an agreement with any third party without the consent of the other.