History of the Peloponnesian War
Thucydides
Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.
He then posted the greater part of his troops, the unarmed as well as the armed, at the best fortified and strongest points of the place, on the side toward the mainland, giving them orders to ward off the enemy's infantry if it should attack. But he himself selected from the whole body of his troops sixty hoplites and a few archers, and with them sallied forth from the fort to the point on the seashore where he thought that the enemy would be most likely to attempt a landing. The ground, indeed, was difficult of access and rocky where it faced the sea, yet since the Athenian wall was weakest at this place the enemy would, he thought, be only too eager to make an assault there;
in fact the Athenians themselves had left their fortification weak at this spot merely because they never expected to be defeated at sea, and Demosthenes knew that if the enemy could force a landing there the place could be taken.
Accordingly he posted his hoplites at this point, taking them to the very brink of the sea, determined to keep the enemy off if he could; and then he exhorted them as follows:
“Soldiers, my comrades in this present hazard, let no one of you at such a time of necessity seek to prove his keenness of wit by calculating the full extent of the danger that encompasses us; let him rather come to grips with the enemy in a spirit of unreflecting confidence that he will survive even these perils. For whenever it has come, as now with us, to a case of necessity, where there is no room for reflection, what is needed is to accept the hazard with the least possible delay.