History of the Peloponnesian War

In a word, it is impossible, and a mark of extreme simplicity, for anyone to imagine that when human nature is wholeheartedly bent on any undertaking it can be diverted from it by rigorous laws or by any other terror.

"We must not, therefore, so pin our faith to the penalty of death as a guarantee against revolt as to make the wrong decision, or lead our rebellious subjects to believe that there will be no chance for them to repent and in the briefest time possible put an end to their error.

Consider now: according to your present policy[*](Athens had not been accustomed to treat secession from the alliance as treason punishable with death for the men and slavery for the women and children.) if a city has revolted and then realizes that it will fail, it may come to terms while still able to pay the indemnity and to keep up its tribute in the future; but, in the other case, what city, think you, will not prepare itself more thoroughly than now, and hold out in siege to the last extremity, if it makes no difference whether it capitulates quickly or at its leisure?

And as for us, how can we fail to suffer loss, incurring the expense of besieging a city because it will not surrender, and, if—we capture it, recovering one that is ruined, and losing thereafter the revenue from it— the source of our strength against our enemies?

We must not, therefore, be such rigorous judges of the delinquents as to suffer harm ourselves, but we must rather see how for the time to come, by punishing moderately, we may have at our service dependent cities that are strong in material resources; and we must deem it proper to protect ourselves against revolts, not by the terror of our laws, but rather by the vigilance of our administration. At present we do just the opposite: