History of the Peloponnesian War

If, then, we should fall upon them suddenly and at night, I believe that, in concert with our supporters inside, if any are left, we should find ourselves masters of the situation.

And let us not shrink from the danger, remembering that the element of surprise in warfare is precisely of this nature.[*](ie. dangerous.) And if a general guards against such surprises in his own case, and, whenever he sees an opportunity to employ them in the case of the enemy, makes the attempt, he will win the greatest success.”

Thus he spoke, but could not win Alcidas to his plan. Then some others, exiles from Ionia, and the Lesbians[*](The πρέσβεις of chs. 4, 5.) who were with the fleet, advised him, since he feared the risk of this enterprise, to seize one of the cities in Ionia, or Cyme in Aeolia, in order that they might have a city as their base and bring Ionia to revolt (and that there was a prospect of success, seeing that everyone welcomed his coming) and might thus steal from the Athenians this the greatest source of their revenue, and at the same time the Athenians might be put to expense, in case they should attempt to blockade their base. They thought, moreover, that they could persuade Pissuthnes to join them in the war.

Alcidas, however, would not accept these proposals, either, but his chief concern, now that he was too late for Mytilene, was to get back to Peloponnesus as quickly as possible.

So he set sail from Embatum and skirted the coast; and putting in at Myonnesus in the country of the Teians he butchered most of the captives whom he had taken on the voyage.

Then he anchored at Ephesus, where he was visited by envoys of the Samians who were settled at Anaea,[*](These were probably the Samians who settled at Anaea, on the coast opposite the island, after the overthrow of Samos in 439 B.C. (cf. 1.117.3). They are referred to in 3.19.2 as “Anaeitans.”) who said that it was an ill way he had of freeing Hellas, to destroy men who were not lifting their hands against him and were not enemies, but were merely allies of the Athenians under compulsion; and unless he abandoned this course he would win few enemies over into friendship and would turn far more friends into enemies.

Alcidas was persuaded, and set free all the Chians whom he still held and some of the others. It should be explained that the people of the coast,[*](ie. the Greeks of whom Alcidas had taken so many prisoners.) when they saw the Peloponnesian ships, made no attempt to flee, but came near, supposing that they were Athenian ships; and they had not the slightest expectation that while the Athenians dominated the sea the Peloponnesian fleet would ever venture over to Ionia.

From Ephesus Alcidas sailed in haste and took to flight; for while still at anchor near Clarus[*](ie. while on his way from Embatum to Ephesus.) he had been sighted by the Salaminia and Paralus,[*](The two swift Athenian state triremes kept always manned ready for extraordinary service. Alcidas knew that these two boats would notify the main Athenian fleet under Paches of his whereabouts, and that Paches would make pursuit.) which happened to be on a voyage from Athens, and in fear of pursuit he sailed through the open sea, determined that he would not, unless obliged to do so, put into land anywhere except in the Peloponnesus.