History of the Peloponnesian War

“Alcidas, and you who, like myself, are present here as commanders of the Peloponnesian forces, it seems to me that we should sail to Mytilene before our approach becomes known, without a moment's delay.

For in all probability we shall find that men who have but lately come into possession of a city are very much off their guard. At sea, indeed, they will be altogether so, where they have no expectation of any possible hostile attack and our role is chiefly to act on the defensive;[*](Or, “while on our side it is just here that our strength lies.”) and on land also their forces are probably scattered among the houses all the more carelessly because they believe that they are victors.

If, then, we should fall upon them suddenly and at night, I believe that, in concert with our supporters inside, if any are left, we should find ourselves masters of the situation.

And let us not shrink from the danger, remembering that the element of surprise in warfare is precisely of this nature.[*](ie. dangerous.) And if a general guards against such surprises in his own case, and, whenever he sees an opportunity to employ them in the case of the enemy, makes the attempt, he will win the greatest success.”

Thus he spoke, but could not win Alcidas to his plan. Then some others, exiles from Ionia, and the Lesbians[*](The πρέσβεις of chs. 4, 5.) who were with the fleet, advised him, since he feared the risk of this enterprise, to seize one of the cities in Ionia, or Cyme in Aeolia, in order that they might have a city as their base and bring Ionia to revolt (and that there was a prospect of success, seeing that everyone welcomed his coming) and might thus steal from the Athenians this the greatest source of their revenue, and at the same time the Athenians might be put to expense, in case they should attempt to blockade their base. They thought, moreover, that they could persuade Pissuthnes to join them in the war.