History of the Peloponnesian War
Thucydides
Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.
still a minor. And they ravaged the parts of Attica that had been laid waste before, wherever any new growth had sprung up, as well as those that had been left untouched in the former invasions. And this invasion proved more grievous to the Athenians than any
except the second;[*](cf. 2.57 2.) for the enemy, who were momentarily expecting to hear from Lesbos of some achievement of their fleet, which they supposed had already got across, went on and on, ravaging most of the country. But when they found that nothing turned out as they expected and their food was exhausted, they withdrew and dispersed to their several cities.[*](It is implied that the Lacedaemonians planned this summer, as on previous invasions, to ravage certain districts and then, after hearing of the success of the fleet at Lesbos, to withdraw. But they were kept in Attica longer than they had intended by the delay on the part of the fleet.)
Meanwhile the Mytilenaeans, seeing that the fleet had not arrived from the Peloponnesus but was loitering on the way, and that their food was exhausted, were compelled to make terms with the Athenians by the following circumstances.
Salaethus, who himself no longer expected the fleet to come, equipped the commons with heavy armour,[*](With shield and spears and breast-plate. The lightarmed troops wore no defensive armour and carried spear or bow.) instead of their former light arms, intending to attack the Athenians;
but the commons, as soon as they had got arms, would no longer obey their commanders, but gathered in groups and ordered the aristocrats to bring out whatever food there was and distribute it to all; otherwise, they said, they would come to terms with the Athenians independently and deliver up the city.