History of the Peloponnesian War
Thucydides
Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.
But if they had begun with us, while the whole body of allies were not only still strong in their own strength, but also had a leader to rally to, they would not have got the mastery so easily.
Besides, our navy caused them some fear, lest it should some day be augmented by being united either with yours or another's and thus become a menace to themselves.
To some extent also we owe our salvation to the court we paid to the Athenian people and to the political leaders of the day.
But we could not have expected to be able to survive for long, if we may judge by their conduct toward the other allies, unless this war had broken out.
"Was this then a friendship or a freedom to put faith in, where we violated our real feelings whenever we treated each other as friends? They courted us in time of war only because they were afraid of us, while we acted in the same manner toward them in time of peace; and good faith, which in most cases is made steadfast by good will, was in our case made secure by fear, and it was fear rather than friendship that held us both to the alliance; and whichever of us should soonest gain boldness through a feeling of security was bound to be the first to commit some act of transgression also.
If, therefore, anyone thinks that, just because they postponed the measures we dread, we do wrong in revolting first, without having waited on our side until we were (quite sure that any of our suspicions would come true, he is in error.
For if we were in a position to meet their plotting by counter-measures on equal terms with them, it was indeed incumbent upon us on our part to postpone likewise our offensive against them; but since the power of attack is always in their hands, the right of acting betimes in our own defence must necessarily be in ours.