History of the Peloponnesian War
Thucydides
Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.
As for the contest, I will not risk it in the gulf if I can help it, nor will I sail into the gulf. For I am aware that a confined space is not an advantage to a fleet of a few ships which are better sailers and have experienced crews, when it is opposed to a large nulnber of ships which are badly managed. For one cannot charge properly upon an enemy ship to ram her side, through not having a clear view of her a long way off, nor can one retire at need when hard pressed; and there is no chance for such manoeuvres as breaking through the line or whirling around to rain, though these are precisely the proper tactics of fast sailing ships, but the sea-fight would have to be turned into a land-battle, and in that case it is the larger fleet that wins.
For these matters, however, I shall make provision to the best of my ability. As for you, keep good order, stay near your ships, give heed sharply to the word of command, especially since the two fleets are at watch so near one another; and when it comes to action, regard discipline and silence, which are generally advantageous in warfare, but especially so at sea, as all important, and ward off the enemy yonder in a manner worthy of your past exploits.
The contest is a momentous one for you—whether you are to shatter the hopes which the Peloponnesians have in their fleet, or to bring closer home to the Athenians their fear about the sea.
Once more I remind you that you have beaten most of them[*](In the first sea-fight, the Peloponnesians had forty-seven ships (Thuc. 2.83.3) against Phormio's twenty (Thuc. 2.83.1); in the second battle the Peloponnesians had seventy-seven ships (Thuc. 2.86.4). Since the Peloponnesians lost twelve ships in the first battle (Thuc. 2.84.4), the expression “most of them” is not quite exact here.) already; and when men have once suffered defeat, their spirit is never the same as before if they are called upon to face the same dangers."
Such were the words with which Phormio also encouraged his men. And the Peloponnesians, when the Athenians did not sail into the gulf and the narrows to meet them, wished to draw them in against their will; so they put out to sea at dawn, and, after lining up their ships four deep,[*](Or, as some take it, in a column four abreast.) sailed along their own shore towards the inner part of the gulf, in the same order as they had lain at anchor,[*](Only now the four ships which had lain at anchor one behind the other sailed, after the turn to the right, abreast.) their right wing leading the way.[*](Or, retaining ἐπὶ instead of παρὰ, after lining up their ships four deep against their own shore (i.e. with it at their backs), sailed toward the inner part of the gulf ....)
Upon their right wing they had placed their twenty best sailing ships, in order that, if Phormio got the impression that their objective was Naupactus and should, following the coast, sail in that direction to its aid, the Athenians might not be able to escape their attack by sailing outside their wing, but might be enveloped by these ships.