History of the Peloponnesian War

Meanwhile the fleet from Corinth and from the other allies on the Crisaean Gulf, which was to have joined Cnemus in order to prevent the Acarnanians on the sea-coast from aiding those in the interior, did not arrive, Iut was obliged, about the day of the battle at Stratus, to fight with Phormio and the twenty Athenian ships which were on guard at Naupactus.

For Phormio was watching them as they sailed along the coast out of the gulf, preferring to attack them in the open water.

Now the Corinthians and their allies on their way to Acarnania were not equipped for fighting at sea, but rather for operations on land, and they had no idea that the Athenians with their twenty ships would dare to bring on an engagement with their own forty-seven. When, however, they saw that the Athenians kept sailing along the opposite coast as long as they themselves continued to skirt the southern shore, and when, as they attempted to cross from Patrae in Achaia to the mainland opposite, making for Acarnania, they observed that the Athenians were bearing down upon them from Chalcis and the river Evenus, and finally when, during the night, they had tried to slip their moorings[*](Or, retaining ὑφορμισάμενοι, they had tried to anchor under cover of night, but had been detected.) and get away but had been detected, under these circumstances they were forced to fight in the middle of the channel.[*](i.e. in the open water between Patrae and the mouth of the Evenus, as opposed to the regions along the shore of the Gulf, where their fleet might run into a harbour.)

Their fleet was commanded by generals from the several states which contributed contingents, the Corinthian squadron by Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas.

The Peloponnesians drew up their ships in as large a circle as they could without allowing the enemy an opportunity to break through,[*](See note on Thuc. 1.99.3.) prows outward, sterns inward; and inside the circle they placed the light boats which accompanied them, and also five of their swiftest ships, in order that they might have only a short distance to sail out and bring support at any point where the enemy attacked.

As for the Athenians, drawn up in single column they kept sailing round the Peloponnesian fleet in a circle, hemming it into a narrower and narrower space, always just grazing by and giving the impression that they would charge at any moment. But orders had been given by Phormio not to attack until he should give the signal;

for he hoped that the enemy's ships would not keep in line, like infantry on land, but would fall foul of one another, and also be thrown into confusion by the small boats, and then if the breeze for which he was waiting while he sailed round, which usually blew from the gulf towards dawn, should spring up, they would not remain steady for any length of time. As for the attack, he thought that was in his power whenever he chose, since his ships were better sailers, and that then was the most favourable moment for it.

So when the wind began to come up, and the ships, already hemmed in a narrow space, were being thrown into confusion both by the violence of the wind and the pressure of the small boats, when ship was dashing against ship and the crews were trying to push them apart with poles, all the while keeping up such shouts and warning cries and abuse of one another that they could not hear either the word of command or the coxswains' calls, and, finally, when the inexperienced rowers, unable to get their oars clear of the water in a heavy sea, were rendering the ships less obedient to the helmsmen, then at this critical moment Phormio gave the signal. Thereupon the Athenians fell upon them; first they sank one of the admirals' ships, and then destroyed the rest as well wherever they came upon them, reducing them to such straits that in their confusion no one turned for defence, but all fled to Patrae and Dyme in Achaia.