History of the Peloponnesian War

"Our embassy did not come here to enter into a dispute with your allies, but on the business for which our city sent us. Perceiving, however, that no small outcry is being made against us, we have come forward, not to answer the charges of the cities (for it can hardly be that either they or we are addressing you as judges), but in order that you may not, yielding to the persuasion of your allies, lightly make a wrong decision about matters of great importance. And at the same time we wish, as regards the whole outcry that has been raised against us, to show that we are rightfully in possession of what we have acquired, and that our city is not to be despised. "Now, what need is there to speak about matters quite remote,[*](The Schol. remarks τὰ κατὰ Ἀμαζόνας καὶ Θρᾷκας καὶ Ηρακλειδας, favourite themes in eulogies, panegyric speeches, etc.) whose only witnesses are the stories men hear rather than the eyes of those who will hear them told?

But concerning the Persian War and all the other events of which you have personal knowledge, we needs must speak, even though it will be rather irksome to mention them, since they are always being paraded. For when we were performing those deeds the risk was taken for a common benefit, and since you got a share of the actual results of that benefit, we should not be wholly deprived of the credit, if there is any benefit in that.

And our aim in the recital of the facts will be, not so much to deprecate censure, as to show by evidence with what sort of city you will be involved in war if you are not well advised.

"For we affirm that at Marathon we alone bore the first brunt of the Barbarian's attack, and that when he came again, not being able to defend ourselves by land, we embarked in a body on our ships and joined in the sea-fight at Salamis. This prevented his sailing against you city by city and ravaging the Peloponnesus, for you would have been unable to aid one another against a fleet so numerous.

And the weightiest testimony to the truth of what we say was afforded by the enemy himself; for when his fleet was defeated, as if aware that his power was no longer a match for that of the Hellenes, he hastily withdrew with the greater part of his army.

"Such, then, was the issue of that battle, and clear proof was given thereby that the salvation of the Hellenes depended upon their ships. To that issue we contributed the three most serviceable elements, namely, the largest number of ships, the shrewdest general, and the most unfaltering zeal. Of the four hundred[*](Probably a round number for 378 given by Hdt. 8.48, of which the Athenian contingent (200, i.e. 180 + 20 lent to the Chalcidians, 8.1) could be spokean of as πλείους τῶν ἡμισέων or with slight exaggeration as ἐλάσσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν.) ships our quota was a little less than two-thirds. The commander was Themistocles, who more than any other was responsible for our fighting the battle in the strait, which most surely was our salvation; and on this account you yourselves honoured him above any stranger who ever visited you.[*](See Hdt. 8.124; Plut. Them. 17.3)

And the zeal we displayed was that of utmost daring, for when there was no one to help us on land, since all the rest up to our very borders were already slaves, we resolved to abandon our city and sacrifice all our possessions; yet not even in that extremity to desert the common cause of the allies who remained, or by dispersing to render ourselves useless to them, but to embark on our ships and fight, and not to be angry because you failed to help us earlier. We therefore maintain that we on our part conferred upon you a benefit at least as great as we received;

for whereas the population of the cities from which you brought aid was still undisturbed and you could hope to possess them in the future, and your motive was fear for yourselves rather than for us—at any rate you did not come near so long as we were still unharmed—we on our part, setting forth from a city that was no more,[*](cf. the taunt of Adimantus: περὶ οὐδεμίης ἔτι πατρίδος ναυμαχήσειςHdt. 8.57.7, You will fight for a country that is no more,, and the famous answer of Themistocles, ὡς εἴη καὶ πόλις καὶ γῆ μέζων ἤπερ κείνοις ἔστ’ ἂν διηκόσιαι νέες σφι ἔωσι πεπληρωμέναι,Hdt. 8.61.8, We have a city and a country greater than yours as long as we have two hundred ships fully manned.) and risking our lives in behalf of one whose future hung upon but a slender hope, bore our part in saving both you and ourselves.

But if we had acted as others did, and through fear of losing our territory had gone over to the Persians earlier in the war, or afterwards had lacked the courage to embark on our ships, in the conviction that we were already ruined, it would from that moment have been useless for you, with your inadequate fleet, to fight at sea, but the Persian's plans would have moved on quietly just as he wished.