History of the Peloponnesian War

for you will be repulsing us who are in peril and are not your enemies, while as regards these men, who are enemies and aggressors, you will not only not be thwarting them, but will even be allowing them to get fresh forces from your own dominions. To that they have no right; but it is right that you should either prevent them from raising mercenaries in places under your control, or else send aid to us also, on whatever terms you may be induced to make; but it would be best of all for you openly to receive and help us.

And many, as we suggested at the outset,[*](Thuc. 1.23.1.) are the advantages which we can show you, and the most important of all is this, that the enemies of both of us are, as we see,[*](So ἦσαν seems to mean here, where εἰσί was to be expected; cf. Thuc. 1.33.3.) the same—which is the surest guarantee of fidelity—and these are not weak, but able to injure those who withdraw from them. And furthermore, when the alliance that is offered is with a maritime and not with a continental power, the alienation of such an ally is not a matter of indifference; on the contrary, you should[*](δεῖ or συμφέρει seems to be implied.) by all means, if possible, permit no one else to possess ships; but if that is impossible, you should have as your friend him who is strongest therein.

" If anyone thinks that this course is indeed expedient, but fears that if he yields to this consideration he will be breaking off the truce,[*](The thirty-years' truce with Sparta, cf. Thuc. 1.23.4.) he should understand that his fear, if backed by strength, will make his enemies more afraid;[*](i.e. of themselves breaking the truce.) whereas, if he reject our alliance, his confidence[*](i.e. in the security of the truce.) will be unsupported by might and will therefore be less formidable against enemies that are strong. He should understand, furthermore, that he is deliberating upon the interests, not so much of Corcyra, as of Athens, and that he is not making the best provision for her when, in the face of the war that is impending and all but present, he hesitates, through cautious consideration of the immediate chances, to attach to himself a country which is not made a friend or a foe except with the most momentous consequences.