History of the Peloponnesian War

and ten years after that the Barbarian came again with his great host against Hellas to enslave it. In the face of the great danger that threatened, the Lacedaemonians, because they were the most powerful, assumed the leadership of the Hellenes that joined in the war; and the Athenians, when the Persians came on, resolved to abandon their city, and packing up their goods embarked on their ships, and so became sailors. By a common effort the Barbarian was repelled; but not long afterwards the other Hellenes, both those who had revolted from the King and those who had joined the first confederacy against him, parted company and aligned themselves with either the Athenians or the Lacedaemonians; for these states had shown themselves the most powerful, the one strong by land and the other on the sea.

The defensive alliance lasted only a little while; then the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians quarrelled and, with their respective allies, made war upon one another, and any of the rest of the Hellenes, if they chanced to be at variance, from now on resorted to one or the other. So that from the Persian invasion continually, to this present war, making peace at one time, at another time fighting with each other or with their own revolted allies, these two states prepared themselves well in matters of war, and became more experienced, taking their training amid actual dangers.

The Lacedaemonians maintained their hegemony without keeping their allies tributary to them, but took care that these should have an oligarchical form of government conformably to the sole interest of Sparta; the Athenians, on the other hand, maintained theirs by taking over in course of time the ships of the allied cities, with the exception of Chios[*](Cf. 6.85.2, 7.57.4) and Lesbos,[*](Lost its independence after the revolt of 427 B.C., cf. Thuc. 3.1.) and by imposing on them all a tax of money. And so the individual resources of the Athenians available for this war became greater than those of themselves and their allies when that alliance was still unimpaired and strongest.

Now the state of affairs in early times I have found to have been such as I have described, although it is difficult in such matters to credit any and every piece of testimony. For men accept from one another hearsay reports of former events, neglecting to test them just the same,[*](i.e., as if they took place in some distant land.) even though these events belong to the history of their own country.

Take the Athenians, for example; most of them think that Hipparchus was tyrant when he was slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton.[*](514 B.C. On this digression, cf. Hdt. 5.55; 6.123; Aristot. Ath. Pol. 17.)They do not know that it was Hippias, as the eldest of the sons of Peisistratus, who was ruler, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were merely his brothers; further, that Harmodius and Aristogeiton, suspecting, on that very day and at the very moment of executing their plan, that information had been conveyed to Hippias by one of their fellow-conspirators, held off from him as forewarned, but wishing to do something before they were seized and then take their chances, fell in with Hipparchus, who was marshalling the Panathenaic procession near the sanctuary called Leocorium,[*](In the inner Ceramicus near the temple of Apollo Patrous.) and killed him.

There are many other matters, too, belonging to the present and not forgotten through lapse of time, regarding which the other Hellenes[*](Herodotus is doubtless one of the Hellenes here criticized; cf. 6.57, referring to the two votes; 9.53, where he seems to have applied a term belonging to a deme (cf. 3.40) to a division of the army.) as well hold mistaken opinions, for example, that at Lacedaemon the kings cast not one but two votes each, and that the Lacedaemonians have the " Pitana company" in their army, which never at any time existed. So averse to taking pains are most men in the search for the truth, and so prone are they to turn to what lies ready at hand.